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Abstract
A model of monetary exchange with private financial intermediation
is constructed. Claims on financial intermedaries of two types are traded
in transactions: circulating notes and deposits. There can be a role for
the government in supplying liqudity, and level changes in the money
supply accomplished through open market operations can be nonneutral.
A Friedman rule is suboptimal, due to costs of maintaining the stock of
currency. The model is used to address some issues related to current
monetary policy in the United States.
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1 Introduction
Liquidity consists of a class of assets that are somehow useful in exchange. Some
of these liquid assets are government liabilities. In the United States, for exam-
ple, Federal Reserve notes serve as a medium of exchange in retail transactions,
deposits with the Federal Reserve are used as a medium of exchange in inter-
bank transactions, and Treasury bills play an important role as collateral in
financial transactions. As well, there are liquid assets that are the liabilities of
private financial intermediaries, or the products of these intermediaries. Banks
issue deposit liabilities which can be traded using debit cards and checks, and
securitized loans can be traded on financial markets or can serve as collateral
in financial transactions. Further, in the past, for example in the United States
prior to the Civil War, in Scotland in the early 19th century, and in Canada
before 1935, private banks could issue small-denomination liabilities that circu-
lated, sometimes alongside government-issued currency. To further complicate
matters, private financial intermediaries that issue liquid liabilities also hold
liquid government liabilities as assets.
Conventional wisdom holds that the main role of a central bank is to manage
public liquidity in a manner that controls inflation, and influences the provision
of private liquidity and credit. However, the mechanism by which central bank
actions aﬀect prices and quantities still appears to be poorly understood. As
evidence for this, consider the dramatic actions taken by the Federal Reserve
System during 2008 and 2009, and the reaction of economists to these actions.
There is considerable disagreement about the implications and appropriateness
of these actions, both inside and outside of the Federal Reserve System. How
do these dramatic interventions matter for inflation and for real activity?
The main purpose of this paper is to build a model of public and private
liquidity to answer some basic questions in monetary economics. What is the
role of a central bank? What is a liquid asset, and what roles do privately-
provided and publicly-provided liquid assets play in exchange? Do open market
operations matter, and if so, why? How should we evaluate the recent actions
of the Federal Reserve System?
The model here builds on the basic New Monetarist framework of Lagos
and Wright (2005) (see also Williamson and Wright 2009). The model adds
a financial intermediation sector, based on a costly state verification friction,
as in Williamson (1987), and on risk-sharing, as in Diamond-Dybvig (1983).
One attraction of this type of intermediation model is that it yields a rich
structure of financial arrangements, including debt contracts and endogenous
default premia. As well, the model yields coexistence of deposit claims and
currency, and determines liquidity premia on tradeable assets, along the lines of
Lagos (2008), Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2009), and Lagos and Rocheteau
(2008).
The first step in the analysis is to consider equilibria without a government.
In such an environment, private financial intermediaries issue two types of trade-
able claims: circulating notes and deposits. These two types of intermediary
liabilities exploit the available information technologies for making transactions.
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Under some conditions, private financial intermediaries will not provide suﬃ-
cient liquid assets in equilibrium to achieve eﬃciency in exchange, and the econ-
omy will have too much private financial intermediation in equilibrium. These
are circumstances where the government can do better.
We model the government as having the ability to tax, to ban private cir-
culating notes, and to issue two types of liabilities: nominal bonds and outside
money. In the policy regime we study, fiscal policy governs the rate of growth
in the total quantity of nominal government liabilities, while monetary policy
determines the composition of the nominal debt. Under conditions such that
the private sector fails to supply suﬃcient liquidity, there always exists a govern-
ment policy which achieves an optimal allocation of resources. The government’s
outside assets and power to tax permit it to correct the “insuﬃcient liquidity”
problem, but the critical source of liquidity turns out to be bonds, rather than
money.
In a regime where there is insuﬃcient liquidity, a one-time open market
purchase is not neutral. Holding constant the rate of growth in total nominal
government debt, if there is a one-time increase in the ratio of money to bonds,
this permanently reduces the real interest rate, and increases the quantity of
lending - there is a type of “credit channel” eﬀect of monetary policy. Thus,
in this regime the central bank may view itself as a powerful institution with
the ability to manipulate GDP at will. However, if the government were setting
policy optimally, the central bank would not have this power - monetary policy
is essentially neutral at the optimum.
There are at least two ways for the government to achieve optimality. First,
it could ban circulating private notes, increase the total nominal debt at the
appropriate rate, and provide a suﬃciently large ratio of bonds to money to
achieve eﬃciency. Second, it could issue suﬃcient government debt to achieve
eﬃciency, and permit unrestricted issue of private circulating notes. Thus, in
the model, central banking is not critical to achieving eﬃciency.
An important result is that a Friedman rule is not optimal. This follows from
the fact that it is costly to maintain the stock of currency. That is, there are
costs associated with replacing worn-out currency and designing the currency to
prevent counterfeiting, that result in a deviation from the Friedman rule. Just
as in Sanches and Williamson (2008), where we consider the role of theft as a
cost of operating a monetary system, the higher are the costs of operating the
monetary system, the larger will be the deviation from the Friedman rule.
An interesting application of the model is to current monetary policy in the
United States, as the model permits us to study a wide range of central bank
interventions. We first consider a monetary policy under which the nominal
interest rate on government debt is zero temporarily, with the expectation that
the policy will be “unwound” in the future. Given the zero nominal interest rate,
if the central bank injects more outside money in the present than is necessary to
achieve a zero nominal interest rate, then this outside money will be hoarded as
bank reserves, with no eﬀect on any prices or quantities. Essentially, there is a
liquidity trap. However, the government could act to issue outside money in the
present to finance private lending, using the returns on its portfolio to retire the
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money in the future. If the government lends on the same terms as do private
sector intermediaries, then its lending will simply displace an equal quantity of
private lending, and the stock of outside money can increase by a large amount in
the present with no eﬀects on quantities and prices. However, if the government
lends on better terms than does the private sector, this will reduce nominal
interest rates on loans, and expand lending. In this case, however, the returns
on the central bank portfolio are insuﬃcient to unwind the monetary injection,
and taxes must be levied to retire the additional outside money in the future.
This causes a redistribution from taxpayers to borrowers. If the central bank
lends only in a segment of the credit market, on favorable terms, then this serves
to reallocate credit. Borrowers who are not on the receiving end of central bank
lending will face higher interest rates, and private lending contracts.
The results here cast the current “quantitative easing” policies of the Fed
in both a positive and a negative light. On the positive side, provided that
large current monetary injections are expected to be undone in the future, it
is possible to have no inflationary consequences from a large expansion in the
Federal Reserve balance sheet. On the negative side, once the nominal interest
rate is zero, central bank intervention is at best of no consequence, and at worst
has important implications for the distribution of credit and wealth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section is
a description of the model, while the third section contains the details of the
intermediary structure. Then, Section 4 contains an analysis of equilibrium
without government, while the Section 5 analysis concerns equilibrium with a
government. Finally, Section 6 applies the model to issues concerning recent
monetary policy in the United States, and Section 7 is a conclusion.
2 The Model
The basic model builds on Lagos-Wright (2005), with an information structure
related to Sanches and Williamson (2009), and a financial intermediation sector
similar to Williamson (1987). Time is indexed by  = 0 1 2  and there are
two subperiods within each period that we denote day and night.
The population consists of three types of economic agents: buyers, sellers,
and entrepreneurs. There is a continuum of buyers with mass one, and each
buyer has preferences given by
0
∞X
=0
[− + ()]
Here, 0    1  denotes the diﬀerence between labor supply and con-
sumption during the day,  is consumption in the night, and (·) is a strictly
increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable function with
(0) = 0 0(0) = ∞ and with the property that there exists some ˆ  0 such
that (ˆ)− ˆ = 0 Define ∗ by 0(∗) = 1 There is a continuum of sellers with
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unit mass, and each seller has preferences
0
∞X
=0
[ − ]
where  is consumption in the day and  is labor supply in the night. The
production technology potentially available to buyers and sellers allows the pro-
duction of one unit of the perishable consumption good for each unit of labor
supply. Buyers can produce only in the day, and sellers only in the night, so we
have one of the necessary ingredients for monetary exchange - a double coinci-
dence problem.
During the day of each period, a continuum of entrepreneurs with mass  is
born, and each lives until the day of the following period. An entrepreneur has
no endowment during his or her life. An entrepreneur born in the day of period
 consumes only in the day of period + 1 and is risk neutral. An entrepreneur
has access to an investment project. This project is indivisible and requires
one unit of the consumption good in the day of period  to operate, and yields
a return of  in the day of period  + 1 where  is distributed according to
the distribution function  () with associated density function () which is
strictly positive on [0 ¯] where ¯  0 Assume also that (·) is continuously
diﬀerentiable. Investment project returns are independent across entrepreneurs.
The return  is private information to the entrepreneur, but subject to costly
state verification, whereby any other individual can bear a fixed cost and observe
 ex post. The verification cost  is entrepreneur-specific, and () denotes
the distribution of verification costs across entrepreneurs, with  ≥ 0
During the night, each buyer is matched at random with a seller. The seller
in a match is not able to observe the buyer’s history, and the seller will never
have an opportunity to signal default on a credit arrangement, so the seller will
not accept a personal IOU in exchange for goods. A fraction  of nighttime
bilateral meetings are not monitored, in the sense that, if the buyer wants to
acquire goods from the seller, he or she must have a claim to goods in the
next day, where the claim is somehow documented in an object that the buyer
carries. In what follows, these objects may be circulating liabilities issued by
financial intermediaries or fiat money issued by the government. In each case,
the issuer of the object must incur a cost to render the object recognizable for
what it is. We will specify this in more detail in what follows. A fraction 1− 
of buyers and sellers are in monitored meetings at night. In these meetings,
though a credit transaction cannot take place between the buyer and the seller,
a communication technology is costlessly available which permits the buyer to
transfer ownership of a claim on a financial intermediary to the seller. Again,
we will spell out more details in what follows.
An important feature of the environment is that, when production and con-
sumption decisions are made during the day, buyers do not know whether they
will be in a non-monitored or a monitored meeting with a seller in the following
night. Each buyer learns this information, which then becomes public, at the end
of the day. This will give rise to a Diamond-Dybvig (1983) risk-sharing role for
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financial intermediaries, in addition to the costly-state-verification/delegated-
monitoring role for intermediation that also exists here.
3 Financial Intermediation
We will assume that stochastic verification is not feasible. Assume that entre-
preneurs are economic agents who are subject to full commitment. Then, as
in Williamson (1987), an eﬃcient lending arrangement is for individual entre-
preneurs to act as perfectly-diversified financial intermediaries. Eﬃcient and
incentive-compatible loan contracts with entrepreneurs take the form of non-
contingent debt. That is, the financial intermediary observes the verification
cost  associated with the entrepreneur in the daytime of period  and oﬀers
him or her a contract that specifies a non-contingent payment () that the
entrepreneur must make to the intermediary in the day of period  + 1 If the
entrepreneur cannot make the loan payment, then default occurs, the intermedi-
ary incurs the verification cost  observes the return  and seizes it. As shown
in Williamson (1987), the expected payoﬀ to the intermediary from the loan
contract, as a function of the non-contingent payment  and the verification
cost  is then given by
( ) = −  ()−
Z 
0
 () (1)
Then, letting () denote the gross real loan interest rate on a loan to an
entrepreneur of type  equation (1) allows us to define the default premium
faced by an entrepreneur of type  which is
() =  [()] +
Z ()
0
 () (2)
Since the financial intermediary is perfectly diversified (this requires only
that it hold a positive mass of loans to entrepreneurs), it can guarantee a certain
return per unit invested, which we denote  In equilibrium, the payoﬀ per unit
invested will be the same for each loan made by the financial intermediary, so
 = ()−  [()]−
Z ()
0
 () (3)
for each entrepreneur who receives a loan. Diﬀerentiating the intermediary’s
expected payoﬀ function in (1), we obtain
1( ) = 1− ()−  ()
11( ) = − 0()− ()
and assume that − 0() − ()  0 for all  ∈ [0 ¯] and for all  ≥ 0
Then ( ) is strictly concave in  for  ∈ [0 ¯] and attains a maximum for
 = ˆ()  ¯ where
1− 
h
ˆ()
i
− 
h
ˆ()
i
= 0 (4)
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In equilibrium, there is a marginal entrepreneur in each period  with verifica-
tion cost ∗ and facing the gross loan interest rate ∗  where, from (4),
1− ∗  (∗ )−  (∗ ) = 0 (5)
so that the gross loan interest rate faced by the marginal entrepreneur maximizes
the expected return to the financial intermediary given the marginal entrepre-
neur’s verification cost ∗  Further, the financial intermediary earns an expected
return  from lending to the marginal borrower, or from (3),
 = ∗ − ∗ (∗ )−
Z ∗
0
 () (6)
Then, each entrepreneur who receives a loan has  ≤ ∗  and if   ∗ then()  ˆ() Entrepreneurs with   ∗ do not receive loans as, even if() = ˆ() for one of these agents, so that the expected return to the in-
termediary is maximized, the intermediary will have an expected loss from the
loan. That is, verification costs for the set of entrepreneurs with   ∗ are too
high for lending to be profitable.
Then, the total quantity of loans extended by financial intermediaries during
the day of period  is given by
 = (∗ ) (7)
Therefore, given the certain return on investment  the loan quantity , the
verification cost of the marginal borrower, ∗  and the gross loan interest rate
faced by the marginal borrower ∗  are determined by (5), (6), and (7). It is
straightforward to show that

 = −
0(∗ )
 (∗ )  0 (8)
Thus, given an increase in the payoﬀ per unit of lending by the financial inter-
mediary, the quantity of lending by financial intermediaries must decline. This
is because, from (3), the loan interest rate for each entrepreneur receiving a
loan will increase, and it will be unprofitable for an intermediary to lend to
a formerly marginal entrepreneur, once the payoﬀ per unit of loans increases.
Further, since the loan interest rate will be higher for each creditworthy entre-
preneur when the deposit rate increases, from (2) each of these creditworthy
entrepreneurs will be faced with a higher default premium.
Given (8), we can write  = () where (·) is a decreasing function.
There is some rich detail in how entrepreneurs’ investment projects are funded
and the structure of loan interest rates and default premia across projects, which
will be particularly useful in the last section of the paper. However the mechan-
ics of investment are fundamentally similar to what we would obtain under
standard production technology with a decreasing marginal product of capital
and 100% depreciation.
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4 Equilibrium Without Government Activity
To understand the role of a central bank in our model, it helps to see how this
economy will perform in the absence of a government. Suppose then, that there
is no central bank or fiscal authority. During the daytime of period  buyers
make production decisions and entrepreneurs make investment decisions, before
buyers learn whether they are making non-monitored or monitored transactions
during the night of period  During the day, buyers produce, make deposits
with financial intermediaries, and the intermediaries lend to entrepreneurs. The
deposit contracts written by buyers with financial intermediaries provide for
particular withdrawal privileges, to be specified below. After these actions are
taken, each buyer learns whether he or she will be engaged in a non-monitored
or a monitored transaction during the night.
If the buyer will meet a seller in the night in a non-monitored transac-
tion, then (as part of the deposit contract previously written with the financial
intermediary) the buyer withdraws circulating notes from the financial inter-
mediary. Circulating notes are claims on the financial intermediary that are
non-replicable, and any seller can verify that these claims are what they pur-
port to be. For the intermediary, circulating notes are costly to issue, requiring
 units of goods for each unit of consumption goods the notes will trade for
in nighttime exchange. This cost is incurred to encode on these notes a non-
replicable message that indicates that the noteholder has a claim on the financial
intermediary. If the buyer learns at the end of the day that he or she will be in
a monitored meeting, then the buyer does not withdraw notes. When a buyer
meets a seller in a monitored meeting, the buyer and seller are able to contact
the bank and transfer deposit claims from the buyer to the seller. Note that
this communication technology is not available in a non-monitored meeting.
Now, let  denote the quantity of goods deposited with the financial in-
termediary by each buyer in the daytime of period , +1 the payoﬀ to each
noteholder in the financial intermediary in the daytime of period +1 and +1
the payoﬀ for each depositor in period  + 1 who did not withdraw circulating
notes. Assume that, in a bilateral meeting between a buyer and seller in the
night, that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. Then, if all circulating
notes are traded away by buyers in the night (as we will show is equilibrium
behavior), the cost to the financial intermediary of issuing circulating notes is
+1 This then implies that the zero-profit condition for the financial inter-
mediary is ¡ − +1¢  = +1 + (1− )+1 (9)
In equation (9), the left-hand side is the payoﬀ per unit invested in loans to
entrepreneurs by the financial intermediary, which is total deposits minus the
cost of note issue, all multiplied by the gross expected return per loan. On the
right hand side are the total payouts by the intermediary to noteholders and
deposit-holders respectively.
An equilibrium deposit contract ( +1 +1) maximizes the expected util-
ity of the buyer, and satisfies the zero-profit condition (9). Therefore, an equi-
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librium deposit contract solves
max
+1+1
Ã
− + (+1) + (1− ) maxˆ+1≤+1
©[(+1 − ˆ+1)] + ˆ+1ª
!
subject to (9). In the optimization problem above, ˆ+1 is the quantity of
deposits not traded away by deposit-holders in monitored transactions during
the night. As the demand for intermediary deposits would be infinite if   1 
in equilibrium we must have
 ≤ 1 
which implies that in equilibrium ( +1 +1) satisfies
0(+1) = 1 +   (10)
0(+1) = 1  if  
1
  (11)
+1 ≥ 
∗
  if  =
1
  (12)
and (9).
Note that the solutions for +1 and +1 from (10)-(12) give the same con-
sumption for buyers in monitored and non-monitored meetings as we would
obtain in equilibrium if buyers knew in the daytime whether they would be in
monitored or non-monitored meetings before consumption and production de-
cisions are made. However, if that were the case, then production would be
diﬀerent in the daytime for monitored and non-monitored buyers. In the model
we are considering here, the deposit contract implies that each buyer makes the
same deposit, so that there is an element of Diamond/Dybvig-type insurance in
the financial intermediation arrangement.
4.1 Case 1: Suﬃcient Liquidity
We will first construct an equilibrium where some buyers will choose to carry
deposit claims from one day to the next. Confine attention to stationary equi-
libria where  =  for all  Buyers will want to carry over deposit claims from a
monitored nighttime trade to the next day if and only if  = 1 and consumption
for buyers in a monitored trade is ∗ the surplus-maximizing quantity. In this
equilibrium, +1 = ˜ where, from (10), ˜ is determined by
0(˜) = 1 +  (13)
Therefore ˜  ∗ so that the quantity traded in non-monitored meetings
during the night is less than the surplus-maximizing quantity, due to the cost
of note issue. As  increases, consumption by buyers in nonmonitored trades
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falls, from (13). The total quantity of loans will be 
³
1

´
. Therefore, given the
zero-profit condition for the financial intermediary, (9), we have

µ
1

¶
1
 = ˜
 + (1− )˜ (14)
where +1 = ˜ for all  Then, from (12) and (14), in equilibrium we must
have

µ
1

¶
≥ ˜ + (1− )∗ (15)
Inequality (15) is what we mean by “suﬃcient liquidity.” This condition states
that, when the real interest rate is equal to the rate of time preference, there
is a suﬃciently large quantity of liquid assets to support an eﬃcient level of
transactions in monitored trades, along with the associated equilibrium level of
transactions in non-monitored trades.
We can restate inequality (15) in terms of the underlying loan contracts
between financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs, using (5), (6), and (7). In-
equality (15) becomes
(∗) ≥ ˜ + (1− )∗
where the verification cost for the marginal entrepreneur, ∗ and the gross loan
interest rate faced by the marginal entrepreneur, ∗ solve
1− ∗(∗)−  (∗) = 0
and
1
 = 
∗ − ∗ (∗)−
Z ∗
0
 ()
Thus, whether there is suﬃcient liquidity or not will depend on the functions
 (·) and (·) In general, if returns on investment projects are higher, say in
the sense of first-order stochastic dominance for the distribution  (·) then the
economy’s capacity to produce private liquidity is greater. Also, if verification
costs are lower across the population of entrepreneurs, i.e. if (·) shifts upward,
then this will tend to increase private liquidity capacity.
4.2 Case 2: Insuﬃcient Liquidity
Next, the case with insuﬃcient liquidity arises if and only if

µ
1

¶
 ˜ + (1− )∗ (16)
Here, buyers will trade away all notes and deposit claims in monitored trades
and   1 . Then, from (11) and (12) we get
0() = 1 +   (17)
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0() = 1  (18)
and the zero-profit condition for financial intermediaries (9) gives
() =  + (1− ) (19)
Then, equations (17)-(19) solve for   and  Assume that
−
00()
0() ≤
1
1 +   for   0 (20)
Proposition 1 If (20) and (16) hold, then there exists a unique equilibrium
with insuﬃcient liquidity with   1 
Proof. Define  ≡  and  ≡ 

  and rewrite (17)-(19) as

1 + 
0() = 1  (21)
0() = 1  (22)
() =  + (1− ) (23)
Then, (21), (22) and (20) imply that, for  ≤ 1  we can write  = () and
 = () with 0()  0 0()  0 (0) = (0) = 0 ( 1 ) = ˜ and
( 1 ) = ∗ From (23), the equilibrium level of  is determined by
() = () + (1− )() (24)
Since the left-hand side of (24) is continuous and strictly decreasing and the right
hand side of (24) is continuous and strictly increasing for  ∈ [0 1 ] with (0) 
(0) + (1− )(0) and ( 1 )  ( 1 ) + (1− )( 1 ) = ˜ + (1− )∗
(from (16)), therefore there is a unique solution for  ∈ (0 1 ) and we also solve
for unique  and  and in turn for unique  and 
In an equilibrium with insuﬃcient liquidity, the economy does not have
enough intertemporal productive capacity to support an eﬃcient quantity of
exchange in monitored transactions. From (17)-(19), and (20), an increase in
the cost of note issue,  causes  to fall, so that buyers consume less in non-
monitored exchanges during the night. As well, when  increases,  increases
in equilibrium, the quantity of lending falls, and  increases, so that buyers
consume more in monitored exchanges in the night.
5 Equilibrium with a Government
Thus far, we have shown how this economy performs without a government.
Financial intermediaries act to eﬃciently channel investment funds to entrepre-
neurs, and the liabilities of financial intermediaries, which can be interpreted as
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circulating currency and bank deposits, are exchanged in decentralized transac-
tions. Financial intermediaries perform a delegated monitoring role, and they
also act to provide insurance against the need for liquid assets in diﬀerent types
of decentralized transactions. Without a government, there is a limit to the
quantity of liquid assets that the private sector can supply for use in transac-
tions. This limit is determined by the quantity of investment projects, verifica-
tion costs, and the costs of providing circulating notes.
In this section, we introduce a government, so that we can address ques-
tions related to public vs. private provision of liquidity. As we will see, both
interest-bearing and non-interest-bearing government liabilities will play impor-
tant roles, with fiscal policy determining the total stock of government liabilities
and monetary policy determining the mix of interest-bearing vs. non-interest-
bearing liabilities.
We will assume that the government in our model has the power to tax, and
the power to prohibit the private issue of circulating notes, but otherwise has
available the same technologies as does the private sector. Each buyer receives a
lump-sum transfer   in real terms, from the government during the daytime of
period  The government issues two liabilities. The first is fiat currency, which
is perfectly divisible and, just as is the case for privately issued circulating notes,
is costly to maintain. To prevent counterfeiting and to encode the information
that makes it clear that the currency was issued by the government requires
that  units of goods be absorbed in the daytime of period  for each unit of
goods the currency trades for at night. The second government liability is a
one-period nominal bond. Nominal bonds are issued during the day of period
, with each selling for one unit of money and paying oﬀ +1 units of money in
the day of period  + 1 Nominal bonds are accounting balances held with the
government that can be transferred using the same communications technology
discussed previously in the context of nighttime monitored transactions. Thus,
government bonds cannot be traded in non-monitored transactions, for the same
reasons that deposits cannot be traded in these transactions.
Letting  denote the price of currency in terms of goods in the daytime of
period  we can then write the government budget constraint as
 [ −−1] +  =  + −1 +   (25)
for  = 1 2  . Here, denotes the money stock in period   is the stock of
nominal bonds, and  is the real value of the money stock in exchange during
the night of period . The left-hand side of (25) is the revenue from money
creation and bond issue, while the right-hand side is the cost of maintaining
the stock of money, plus total payouts by the government to retire outstanding
bonds, plus transfers. In period 0,
00 + 00 = 0 + 0 (26)
so that private agents are endowed with no outside assets at the first date.
At this stage, we will assume that private sector intermediaries are prohib-
ited from issuing circulating notes in this regime, so that it is not possible to
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use private note issue to finance lending to entrepreneurs or the purchase of
government bonds. However, private intermediaries can hold government bonds
and issue deposits. In equilibrium, it will be irrelevant whether buyers hold
government bonds directly or the deposits of institutions that intermediate gov-
ernment bonds, so for convenience we will assume that all government bonds
intermediated, with intermediary deposits backed by loans to entrepreneurs and
nominal government bonds.
As in the economy without a government, during the day each buyer pro-
duces and makes a deposit with the financial intermediary. Here, the interme-
diary holds a portfolio of nominal government bonds, loans to entrepreneurs,
and currency. Buyers who learn that they will meet sellers during the night in
non-monitored trades withdraw currency from the financial intermediary at the
end of the day. In equilibrium, the intermediary must be indiﬀerent between
holding nominal government bonds and loans to entrepreneurs, so
 = +1+1 
Further, in equilibrium bonds and loans to entrepreneurs will dominate cur-
rency in rate of return, since deposit claims cannot be traded in non-monitored
exchanges at night, but currency can be exchanged in all transactions. As well,
no gross rate of return can exceed 1  since this would represent an arbitrage
opportunity. Therefore, in equilibrium,
+1
 ≤  ≤
1
  (27)
Now, given (27), and since there is no aggregate uncertainty, the financial in-
termediary will hold only enough currency to satisfy the withdrawal demands
of buyers in non-monitored trades. Let  denote the real quantity of money
balances acquired in the daytime of period  by the financial intermediary per
depositor who will actually withdraw money at the end of the day. As well,
let  denote the real quantity of government bonds and loans to entrepreneurs
acquired by the intermediary, per depositor who will not withdraw. It is then
straightforward to show, in a manner similar to the analysis in the previous
section, that  solves µ+1

¶
0
µ+1
 
¶
= 1 (28)
and  solves
0() = 1 if   1  (29)
or
 ≥ ∗ if  = 1  (30)
In equilibrium each buyer deposits +(1−) with the financial intermediary
in the daytime of period  Thus, as in the regime without a government, the
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financial intermediary provides Diamond-Dybvig-type insurance. However, in
contrast to the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) setup, the bank here insures against the
state where the buyer is in a monitored trade.
In equilibrium, all assets must be willingly held. Therefore,
(1− )  = () +  (31)
and
 =  (32)
Finally, the government budget constraints (25) and (26) must hold.
5.1 Government Policy
In this subsection, we set up a policy regime in which the total nominal govern-
ment debt grows at a constant rate, determined by fiscal policy, and monetary
policy determines the composition of the total outstanding debt. In the day-
time of period 0, the government begins by transferring 0 units of fiat money
and 0 nominal bonds in equal amounts to buyers, with the real value of the
transfer, from (26), determined by the equilibrium price of money, 0 Then,
assume that in the daytime of each period  = 1 2 3  the government levies
taxes on buyers to pay the interest on the government bonds that come due,
and to pay the costs of maintaining the currency stock. Further, during the
daytime of periods  = 1 2 3  the government gives a nominal transfer of
 −−1 units of money and  −−1 nominal bonds to each buyer. Then,
it is straightforward to verify that the government budget constraint (25) holds
for each  = 1 2 3  .
Now, let  denote the constant gross rate of growth of currency outstanding
and nominal bonds, with  = −1 and  = −1 for  = 1 2 3  . This
implies that the ratio of the currency stock to the stock of bonds is constant over
time. For convenience, let  denote the fraction of nominal debt outstanding
that consists of currency, i.e.
 = ( +) (33)
for all  where 0 ≤  ≤ 1 We can then interpret  as being determined by
fiscal policy, and  by monetary policy, though in the model there is nothing
that distinguishes the fiscal authority from the monetary authority.
5.1.1 Equilibrium with Suﬃcient Liquidity
We will confine attention to stationary equilibria with valued fiat currency,
which implies that +1
 =
1
 (34)
for all  As in the case with no government, if there is suﬃcient liquidity avail-
able, then in monitored exchange during the night an eﬃcient quantity ∗ is
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traded, and the gross return on loans and bonds is  = 1  From (28) and (34),
we get


0
µ
ˆ
¶
= 1 (35)
which solves for the real quantity of currency per buyer in non-monitored trades,
ˆ Then, from (31), (32), and (33), in equilibrium,
 = (
1
 )
1−  +
(1− )ˆ
(1− ) (36)
Therefore, from (30) and (36), there is suﬃcient liquidity if and only if
( 1 ) +
(1− ) ˆ
 ≥ (1− )
∗
where the left-hand side is the quantity of lending to entrepreneurs at the gross
real return 1  plus the equilibrium real quantity of government debt, and the
right-hand side is the total quantity of goods traded in eﬃcient exchanges in
monitored meetings at night. Here, ˆ is determined by (35). Thus, the real
quantity of bonds is determined by the demand for currency in non-monitored
transactions, from (35), and the government policy rule (33). We can rewrite
the above inequality as
1− 
 ≥
(1− )∗ − ( 1 )
ˆ  (37)
Proposition 2 For any  ≥  there exists a ∗  0 such that, if  ≤ ∗ then
there exists a government equilibrium with suﬃcient liquidity.
Proof. Given any  ≥  (35) determines ˆ Then there exists an equilibrium
with suﬃcient liquidity if and only if (37) holds. But (37) holds if and only if
 ≤ ∗ where
∗ = 1 if ∗(1− )− ( 1 ) ≤ 0
∗ = ˆˆ+ (1− )∗ − ( 1 )
 if (1− )∗ − ( 1 )  0
Thus, for any feasible rate of growth for the total nominal government debt,
there exists a critical ratio of money to nominal government bonds such that, if
the ratio of money to bonds is less than this critical level, an equilibrium with
suﬃcient liquidity exists. From (35), the real quantity of currency is determined
by the rate of growth in total government liabilities, which also determines the
inflation rate. Then, monetary policy, which has no eﬀect on the real quantity
of money, determines the real quantity of bonds, which in part backs financial
intermediary deposits. Thus, it is the real quantity of bonds that is the key
source of publicly provided liquidity influenced by monetary policy. The result
above states that it is always possible to find a monetary policy that results in
suﬃcient provision of public liquidity that there is eﬃcient trade in monitored
transactions.
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5.1.2 Equilibrium with Insuﬃcient Liquidity
Next, look for an equilibrium in which there is insuﬃcient liquidity to support
eﬃcient exchange in monitored meetings during the night. In this equilibrium,
  1  and from (29) the quantity of deposit claims held at the end of the day
by each buyer who will trade in a monitored meeting at night,  is determined
by
0() = 1 (38)
As in the case with suﬃcient liquidity, the real quantity of currency held by
each buyer at the end of the day who will trade in a non-monitored meeting,
 is determined by


0
µ

¶
= 1 (39)
Also, from (31), (32), and (33), we have
 = ()
1−  +
(1− )
(1− ) (40)
Equations (38)-(40) solve for   and 
Proposition 3 If
−
00()
0() ≤ 1 for   0 (41)
and
1− 
 
(1− )∗ − ( 1 )
˜  (42)
where ˜ solves 

0
µ
˜
¶
= 1 (43)
then an equilibrium with a government and insuﬃcient liquidity exists and it is
unique.
Proof. Given , equation (39) solves for the real quantity of currency which
we denote ˜ Then, from (38), if (41) holds then  = () where (·) is an
increasing and continuous function. Then from (40), we have
() = ()
1−  +
(1− )˜
(1− )  (44)
Now, let () denote the right-hand side of (44), which is a decreasing and
continuous function of We then have (0) = 0 ( 1 ) = ∗ (0) =  and
( 1 ) = (
1
 )
1− +
(1−)˜
(1−)  Then, since (0)  (0) if ( 1 )  ( 1 ) then a
unique solution for  exists with   1 . Thus, the condition we need is
( 1 )
1−  +
(1− )˜
(1− )  
∗
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which can be manipulated to give (42). Once we have a unique solution for 
we solve uniquely for  from  = ()
Now, given (41), an increase in  results in a decrease in from (39). Then,
equation (44) implies that  decreases, and so the quantity of lending to entre-
preneurs, () increases. Then, (38) implies that  falls. Thus, consumption
falls for all buyers during the night. Thus, an increase in the growth rate in the
total nominal stock of government liabilities, when there is insuﬃcient liquidity,
acts to reduce the real quantity of money, and by implication the real quantity
of government bonds in equilibrium, thus reducing the real stock of liquid assets.
The real interest rate falls, and lending increases, thus increasing the stock of
privately-supplied liquid assets, but this does not completely mitigate the loss
of publicly-supplied liquid assets.
An increase in  is interpreted as a monetary policy action, in that this
increases the ratio of money to bonds, holding constant the growth rate in
the total stock of government liabilities. This is essentially a one-time open-
market purchase of bonds. From (44), this reduces  so that () the quantity
of lending to entrepreneurs, increases. From (39),  remains unaﬀected, so
that the price level increases in proportion to the increase in the money stock.
Consumption for buyers in non-monitored trades in the night is unaﬀected, but
consumption for buyers in monitored trades must fall.
Thus, monetary policy is not neutral, given insuﬃcient liquidity. A one-
time open market purchase, which produces a level increase in the money stock,
reduces the real quantity of government-supplied liquid assets, the real interest
rate falls, and there is an increase in lending. All of these eﬀects are permanent.
This is a key result, and appears to be a unique property that this model does
not share with alternative frameworks for analyzing monetary policy. In the
insuﬃcient liquidity case, monetary policy is not neutral, but the nonneutrality
does not work through conventional means, as what we typically consider to
be “liquidity” - the stock of money - is invariant in real terms to the change
in monetary policy. Again, the key publicly-provided liquid asset is the stock
of government bonds, and monetary policy actions aﬀect the real value of this
stock, causing changes in the privately-provided liquidity and the quantity of
private lending.
5.1.3 Optimal Government Policy
In this section we want to determine, within the class of policies under consid-
eration, which ones are optimal. Suppose first that we look for a policy that
maximizes the total net surplus in nighttime trading, minus the total cost per
period of maintaining the money stock. Then, letting  and  denote, respec-
tively, the quantity of output traded during the night in nonmonitored and
monitored trades, this quantity is given by
 =  [()− ] + (1− )[()− ]− 
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Then, suppose that we choose  and  to maximize  This gives  = ˆ and
 = ∗ where ˆ solves
0(ˆ) = 1 +  (45)
From (35) and (37), this outcome can be supported as an equilibrium with
 =  (1 + ) (46)
and with  set to satisfy
1− 
 ≥
(1− )∗ − 
³
1

´
(1 + )ˆ  (47)
so that there is suﬃcient liquidity. Thus, the above outcome can be achieved
with a unique growth rate for total nominal government debt. This optimal
growth rate is larger than the Friedman-rule money growth rate, with the gap
between the optimal money growth rate and the Friedman rule rate increasing
with the cost of maintaining the stock of currency. The optimal nominal in-
terest rate on bonds is , and equation (46) implies that, in equilibrium at the
optimum, the inflation tax is just suﬃcient to finance the costs of maintaining
the stock of currency. Given the optimal money growth rate, (47) states that 
the ratio of money to total nominal government debt, must be suﬃciently small
so that the stock of liquid assets backing bank deposits is suﬃciently large, in
real terms.
Given the government policy specified by (46) and (47), the financial inter-
mediation arrangement we have specified allocates resources eﬃciently between
entrepreneurs and other agents (under the restriction of pure verification strate-
gies). Therefore, this policy is one that maximizes the sum of utilities across
agents in a stationary equilibrium, within the class of policies under considera-
tion.
Now, note that, if (15) holds, so that there is suﬃcient liquidity in the
absence of government, that the optimal government policy achieves the same
equilibrium allocation as in the case without a government, where all liquidity is
supplied by private financial intermediaries. Government policy can improve on
what the private sector can accomplish, only if private intermediation supplies
an insuﬃcient quantity of liquidity to support eﬃcient exchange. Thus, in this
environment, government-provided liquidity need not be essential.
However, if (16) holds, then the ability of the private sector to provide liq-
uidity is suﬃciently limited that the government can improve matters. It is
important to note, though, that even in these circumstances a central bank is
not necessary. An optimum could either be achieved with a prohibition on the
issue of private circulating notes and an appropriate monetary policy with cen-
tral banking, or by having the government supply the appropriate quantity of
government debt while permitting unrestricted issue of private circulating notes.
As well, if private circulating notes are banned and the government is behaving
optimally, so that (47) holds, then at the margin monetary policy is irrele-
vant, in that changes in  serve only to change the price level and aﬀect no real
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quantities. Monetary policy can matter in a way that appears consistent with
conventional central-banking wisdom, in that an open market purchase reduces
the real interest rate and increases private lending. However, monetary policy
matters in this fashion only when the government is behaving suboptimally.
Since the departure from the Friedman rule dictated by (46), and the optimal
inflation rate depend on  the cost of maintaining the money stock, one obvious
question is how large  might be in practice. If  represents only the costs of
wear-and-tear on the currency stock, and the costs of designing the currency
stock to deter counterfeiting, then these costs are likely negligible, as a fraction
of the value of transactions supported by the currency stock over a given period
of time. However, if we take  to represent all of the costs of operating a
central bank, then clearly these costs are significant, and will matter in an
important way for determining the optimal inflation rate. A case can certainly
be made for the latter interpretation. Further, if we seriously address the costs
of counterfeiting and theft that arise from economic activities that are a pure
deadweight loss, then this would add to the costs of operating a currency system,
and would give us additional reasons for departures from the Friedman rule (see
for example Sanches and Williamson 2008).
6 U.S. Monetary Policy and the Financial Crisis
There are two unusual features associated with recent monetary policy in the
United States. First, the nominal interest rate on short-term government debt
has been essentially zero since late 2008, which has never been the case in the
history of the Federal Reserve System. For monetary economists, there is noth-
ing unusual about a zero nominal market interest rate. Indeed, we are accus-
tomed to working with models in which a Friedman rule achieves eﬃciency, and
does this by driving the nominal interest rate to zero in all states of the world.
However, it seems clear that the U.S. economy is not currently in a permanent
Friedman-rule monetary regime. The Federal Reserve System appears intent
on increasing the nominal interest rate on Treasury bills above zero sometime
in the future, though the Fed has made no commitment as to when this will
happen. Second, the Fed has engaged in some unusual types of lending, for ex-
ample to non-bank financial intermediaries, and has accumulated some unusual
assets (for a central bank), including commercial paper and mortgage-backed
securities. These types of interventions are certainly not common currency for
monetary economists, and are not the types of experiments we typically consider
in the context of monetary models.
The approach we will take in this section is to consider a world in which, as
of  = 0 whatever shock or shocks led to the financial crisis have been realized,
with all features of the environment and fiscal policy fixed from  = 0 forward.
Then, we take monetary policy for  = 1 2 3  as given, and consider how
alternative monetary policies at  = 0 matter. We first consider the eﬀects
of open market purchases at  = 0 when the nominal interest rate is positive.
Then, we show what level of open market purchases at  = 0 will support a
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zero nominal interest rate at the first date, and determine the eﬀects of further
open market purchases when the nominal interest rate is zero. Then, we consider
how an expanded role for central bank financial intermediation at  = 0 matters,
conditional on the nominal interest rate being zero.
6.1 Open Market Purchases at  = 0 : Positive Nominal
Interest Rate
First, fix fiscal policy for  = 0 1 2  with  = ˆ and assume that the intention
of the central bank is to pursue a policy in periods  = 1 2 3  with  = ˆ
This policy may be suboptimal, but for the experiments we consider here we
will treat it as fixed, and think about the eﬀects of central bank intervention in
period 0. Given the policy in periods  = 1 2 3  whether the economy has
suﬃcient liquidity or not, at  = 1 2 3  we have  = ˆ determined by (35)
given  = ˆ Therefore, the price of money in period 1 is given by
1 = ˆ1  (48)
given take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers by the buyer and market clearing during the day.
Further, so long as ˆ   we have ˆ  ∗
Now, consider the eﬀects at  = 0 of monetary policy, characterized by 0
the ratio of outside money to total nominal government debt in period 0 The
stocks of outside money and nominal bonds at  = 0 are then
0 = 10ˆˆ  (49)
and
0 = 1 (1− 0)ˆˆ (50)
Then, let 0 and 0 denote, respectively, the real quantity of outside money
held by each buyer who will be trading with currency in the night and the real
quantity of interest-bearing assets backing the deposits of each buyer who will
be trading deposits at night, as of the end of the day in period 0. If there
is suﬃcient liquidity in period 0, the period 0 real interest rate is 0 = 1 
Analogous to (35) we then have
1
0 
0
µ1
0 0
¶
= 1 (51)
and suﬃcient liquidity for eﬃcient trading in monitored meetings in the night
of period 0 requires that
0 ≥ ∗ (52)
Further, in equilibrium the daytime markets in period 0 for money and interest-
bearing assets, respectively, must clear, so
0 = 00  (53)
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0 =
( 1 )
1−  +
00
(1− )  (54)
If the nominal interest rate is positive at  = 0, then
1
0 
1
  (55)
Therefore, from (48)-(55), given 0 we solve for 0 according to
0 = ˆ1 
0
µˆ0
ˆˆ
¶
 (56)
and for suﬃcient liquidity 0 must satisfy
( 1 )
1−  +
ˆ (1− 0)
(1− )ˆˆ 
0
µˆ0
ˆˆ
¶
≥ ∗ (57)
Now, with suﬃcient liquidity, an increase in 0 (an open market purchase at
 = 0) has no eﬀect on the real interest rate 0 as it only reduces the left-hand
side of (57). Buyers in monitored meetings during the night of period 0 will
have suﬃcient deposit holdings to purchase the eﬃcient quantity ∗ Since there
is no eﬀect on 0 the quantity of lending in period 0, (0) does not change.
However, from (56), 0 falls, and so the gross nominal interest rate, 001  must
fall, since 0 and 1 are unaﬀected by the change in 0 Consumption by buyers
in non-monitored exchanges during the night must rise.
Next, consider the case where there is insuﬃcient liquidity at  = 0 so that
the quantity traded in each monitored trade is less than ∗ Then, as in the
suﬃcient liquidity case, given 0 the price of money in period 0 is determined
by (56), but for insuﬃcient liquidity we require
( 1 )
1−  +
ˆ (1− 0)
(1− )ˆˆ 
0
µˆ0
ˆˆ
¶
 ∗ (58)
Further, analogous to (38) we have
00(00) = 1 (59)
and, similar to (54) we have
0 = (0)
1−  +
00
(1− ) 
or, using (50) and (56),
0 = (0)
1−  +
ˆ (1− 0)
(1− )ˆˆ 
0
µˆ0
ˆˆ
¶
 (60)
In this case, from (56), (59), and (60), an increase in 0 reduces 0 and
0 and reduces the nominal interest rate in period 0. As a result, lending
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increases in period 0, and the quantity of goods traded in each monitored and
nonmonitored transaction during the night falls and increases, respectively.
Therefore, whether there is suﬃcient or insuﬃcient liquidity at  = 0 an
open market purchase acts to reduce the nominal interest rate and increase
the consumption of buyers trading in non-monitored meetings in the night of
period 0. The real interest rate will fall, and lending will increase, only if there
is insuﬃcient liquidity.
6.2 Open Market Purchases at  = 0 : A Zero Nominal
Interest Rate and the Liquidity Trap
Thus far, we have determined that, given an arbitrary fiscal policy, and fixing
future monetary policy, open market purchases of nominal government bonds
at  = 0 will reduce the nominal interest rate. The next issue concerns whether
it is feasible to reduce the nominal interest rate to zero at  = 0 If so, then we
wish to determine the consequences of open market purchases at the zero lower
bound.
First, suppose that 0 = ˜0 where ˜0 is suﬃciently large that the nominal
interest rate is zero, but buyers in non-monitored exchanges during the night of
 = 0 have just enough currency to purchase ∗ goods. This implies, from (56),
that
˜0 = 
∗ˆˆ
ˆ  (61)
Then, for there to be suﬃcient liquidity, from (61) and (57), we must have
( 1 ) +
ˆ
ˆˆ ≥ 
∗ (62)
Further, for the zero nominal interest rate policy to be feasible, we require ˜0 ≤ 1
or, from (61),
ˆ
ˆˆ ≥ 
∗ (63)
If (62) and (63) hold, and 0 = ˜0 then an equilibrium exists where the
nominal interest rate is zero at  = 0 implying that ∗ is exchanged in all
trades during the nighttime of  = 0 Now, suppose that (62) and (63) hold,
but 0 ≥ ˜0 What happens in this case if 0 increases? Essentially, there is a
liquidity trap. When 0 ≥ ˜0 there is suﬃcient liquidity to support exchange of
∗ units of goods in each nighttime transaction, and for a financial intermediary
nominal government bonds and outside money are equivalent, as they yield the
same return. Thus, an open market purchase changes no quantities and prices,
and financial intermediaries are content to hold the additional outside money
as reserves until  = 1
Next, consider the case where the nominal interest rate is zero and there is
insuﬃcient liquidity. In contrast to (62), here we must have
( 1 ) +
ˆ
ˆˆ  
∗ (64)
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We know from the previous analysis that, when the nominal interest rate is
greater than zero and there is insuﬃcient liquidity, an increase in 0 will reduce
the nominal interest rate. We then need to determine that, when (64) is satisfied,
there exists some ˜0, with 0  ˜0 ≤ 1 such that 0 = 10 when 0 ≥ ˜0 From
(56), (59), and (60), the critical value ˜0 the real interest rate given that critical
value, ˜0 and the quantity of deposits per buyer in monitored trades, ˜0 are
jointly determined by
˜00
Ã
ˆ˜0
ˆˆ
!
= 1 (65)
˜00(˜0˜0) = 1 (66)
˜0 = (˜0)
1−  +
ˆ
³
1− ˜0
´
(1− )ˆˆ 
0
Ã
ˆ˜0
ˆˆ
!
 (67)
From (65)-(67), ˜0 is uniquely determined, but in addition to (64) we require
that ˜0 ≤ 1 If  = 0 so that there are no entrepreneurs in the model and the
only liquidity is publicly provided, then (˜0) = 0 for all ˜0 Then, by continuity,
as long as  is suﬃciently small, if (64) holds, then (65)-(67) solves for ˜0 ≤ 1
and there is a suﬃciently large open market purchase in period 0 that will drive
the nominal interest rate to zero.
Now, suppose that (64) holds and it is feasible to set 0 so that the nominal
interest rate is zero in period 0. What happens if 0 ≥ ˜0 and 0 increases?
Just as in the case with suﬃcient liquidity, there is a liquidity trap. However,
with insuﬃcient liquidity, the eﬀect of the open market purchase in period 0 is
to simply ask financial intermediaries to exchange nominal government bonds
for outside money, which they are happy to do. The intermediaries then hold
the money as reserves backing deposits, which all change hands in transactions
made during the night of period 0. There is no eﬀect of the increase in 0 on
any quantities or prices.
6.3 Direct Lending By the Central Bank
Suppose that, at  = 0 the central bank has conducted suﬃcient open market
purchases of nominal government debt to drive the nominal interest rate to zero.
However, the central bank (for whatever reason) would like private financial in-
termediaries to lend more. Conducting further open market purchases does not
accomplish this, as financial intermediaries will hold the extra outside money
that is injected as reserves, until  = 1 Frustrated in its attempts to get private
intermediaries to lend more, the central bank decides to intermediate private
lending directly, rather than working through private intermediaries. For sim-
plicity, suppose that the central bank sets 0 = ˜0 so as to just achieve a zero
nominal interest rate, and then issues ˜ additional units of outside money in
order to finance loans to entrepreneurs. These loans are made on the same
terms that private intermediaries are willing to oﬀer. That is, we assume that
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the central bank is as eﬃcient as private intermediaries, facing the same verifi-
cation costs as the private sector, and that it writes eﬃcient debt contracts. If
the central bank takes on as much loans as it can with an expected payoﬀ of 0
then it will have issued a total nominal quantity of money in period 0 equal to
0 + ˜ =0 +  (0) 10 
Lending to entrepreneurs will now have become unprofitable for private financial
intermediaries, the stock of money will have expanded by ˜ in period 0, but
all prices and quantities (at all dates) will be identical to what they were in
the absence of central bank lending to entrepreneurs. In period 1, the extra
outside money ˜ is retired using the returns on the central bank’s portfolio.
This government lending program accomplished nothing, other than to displace
an equal quantity of private lending. However, the program also had no eﬀect
on prices, in spite of a potentially large increase in the stock of outside money.
The key to this result is that the extra money that was injected was fully backed
by private loans, and was retired in the future.
Now, note that, even in the equilibrium with a zero nominal interest rate on
deposits and government bonds, there are some interest rates that are positive.
In particular, from (3), an entrepreneur in period 0 with verification cost  will
face a nominal interest rate
0
1
(
 [0()] +
Z 0()
0
 ()
)
 0
which is equal to the gross inflation rate multiplied by the entrepreneur’s default
premium, given his or her gross real loan interest rate 0() Now, suppose that
the central bank is even more ambitious, and decides it will lend to entrepreneurs
on better terms than would private intermediaries, with the goal of reducing
nominal loan interest rates and increasing lending to entrepreneurs. The central
bank writes eﬃcient loan contracts with entrepreneurs, but extends loans with
an expected payoﬀ of ¯0  0 where 0 is the real return on nominal government
bonds, and on outside money, given that the nominal interest rate is zero in
period 0.
If there is suﬃcient liquidity, i.e. (62) holds, then since (¯0)  (0) there
is now a larger real supply of liquidity at  = 0 with the extra injection of
outside money, in nominal terms, equal to
˜ =  (¯0) 10 
With a positive nominal interest rate and insuﬃcient liquidity, 0 0 and 0
were determined by (56), (59), and (60). Now, with a zero nominal interest
rate, insuﬃcient liquidity, and central bank lending, 0 and 0 are determined
by
00(00) = 1 (68)
24
and
0 =  (¯0) + ˆˆˆ0  (69)
where (0) is the real value of the outside money (˜) issued to finance lending
to entrepreneurs, and ˆˆˆ0 = 0(0 + 0) is the real value of the unbacked
money and bonds issued at  = 0 The price of money at  = 0 is
0 = 10 =
ˆ
10  (70)
As with the suﬃcient liquidity case, assume that lump-sum taxes are levied on
buyers at  = 1 to make up for the shortfall in the returns on the central bank
portfolio, as required to retire ˜ units of money at  = 1
Now, what happens if the central bank reduces ¯0 lending on more generous
terms to entrepreneurs? Clearly, the quantity of lending will increase. Also,
given the assumption (41), from (68) and (69) 0 and 0 increase, so that the
real interest rate on bonds rises, and buyers consume more in meetings during
the night, since there is a greater quantity of liquidity backing deposits. As
well, since 0 increases, 0 falls, so the price level rises at the first date. but
private agents are willing to hold the extra outside money injection until  = 1
facing the same equilibrium prices as when there was no central bank lending
program. However, at  = 1 the returns on the central bank loan portfolio are
now insuﬃcient to retire the extra ˜ units of outside money. The money can
be retired through lump-sum taxation of buyers at  = 1 Thus, the central bank
will have reduced the nominal interest rates faced by entrepreneurs at  = 0
lending will have increased, and entrepreneurs will be better oﬀ. However,
buyers will be worse oﬀ due to the higher lump-sum taxes they face at  = 1
The central bank has achieved its goal, but there has been a redistribution of
wealth. Some ineﬃcient investment projects are being undertaken at public
expense.
Now, suppose that central bank lending takes a somewhat diﬀerent form. In
particular, assume that the central bank makes loans with an expected payoﬀ
of ¯0 in period 0, but only to entrepreneurs who would not obtain loans from
private intermediaries. In this case, our results are not much diﬀerent in the
suﬃcient liquidity case, except that the tax imposed at  = 1 does not need
to be as large, since the central bank makes a loss only on marginal loans. In
the case with insuﬃcient liquidity, the quantity of outside money that must be
issued at  = 0 to finance central bank lending is
˜ = [ (¯0)− (0)] 10 
However, 0 and 0 are determined exactly as in the case where the central bank
lends to all entrepreneurs, by equations (68) and (69). The diﬀerence here is
that 0 increases when ¯0 decreases. Therefore, when the central bank lends on
more generous terms to marginal borrowers, it reduces the amount of private
credit, and raises the interest rates faced by entrepreneurs who borrow from
private financial intermediaries.
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6.4 Discussion
The policy experiments studied in this section illustrate some key features of
the current policy dilemma for the Federal Reserve System in the US. There is
both good news and bad news. On the positive side, it is possible for there to be
large increases in the stock of outside money without inflationary consequences.
Once the nominal interest rate is zero in the present, additional money injections
conducted by way of conventional open market purchases of government debt
are held in equilibrium as reserves by financial intermediaries. Given that it
is anticipated that the outside money will be retired in the future, the path
for prices does not change. As well, unconventional purchases of assets by
the central bank, which are essentially direct lending by the central bank in our
model that expand the stock of outside money, are irrelevant for prices, provided
the central bank lends on the same terms as does the private sector. The price
level can increase in the present only if there is insuﬃcient liquidity and the
central bank lends on better terms than the private sector, thus expanding the
supply of credit. However, this has no implications for future prices if the outside
money issued to finance central bank lending is retired in the future.
On the negative side, our analysis casts “quantitative easing” in a bad light.
Conventional open market purchases at a zero nominal interest rate are irrel-
evant. There is a liquidity trap phenomenon, whereby the money injection is
held by financial intermediaries until it is retired in the future, with no eﬀect
on any prices or quantities. We could modify our model to include long-term
government debt, and open market purchases conducted in this long-term debt,
and our results would not change. If the central bank purchases private debt
instruments, eﬀectively acting much like a private financial intermediary, then
this is also irrelevant, if the central bank lends on the same terms as does the
private sector. However, if the central bank lends on better terms than the pri-
vate sector, then this has redistributional implications. Borrowers clearly gain in
the present, but someone must suﬀer in the future if today’s money injection is
to be retired, since the return on the central bank’s loan portfolio will be insuf-
ficient for the task. Further, if the central bank confines its subsidized lending
to one segment of the credit market (the mortgage market, for example), then
this serves to reallocate credit. Borrowers who are not on the receiving end of
central bank lending borrow at higher interest rates as a result of the central
bank intervention.
In acquiring private debt instruments, such as mortgage-backed securities,
the central bank may feel that it is somehow taking up the slack for private
financial intermediaries that are reluctant to lend. However, this is an endoge-
nous outcome. In our model, in the absence of the central bank lending, the
private sector would be lending more. Further, to the extent that the central
bank is lending on generous terms, or investing in assets of questionable quality,
its ability to retire money in the future is impaired, and the Fed could find
itself unable to keep the nominal interest rate at zero or to curb the resulting
inflation.
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7 Conclusion
The model constructed here contains an explicit role for liquid assets in re-
tail transactions. Under some circumstances, given the available information
technology, what is required for making transactions is an asset like currency.
However, currency is costly to produce, as counterfeiting must be deterred, the
currency stock wears out over time, and information must be encoded in the
currency concerning what it is a claim to. In our model, the private sector and
the government possess the same currency technology, and so circulating notes
can in principle be issued by the private sector. There may be circumstances in
the model where a sophisticated information technology is available, allowing
decentralized transactions to be executed using deposit claims on financial inter-
mediaries. These transactions correspond to retail payments using debit cards
and checks. Deposit claims on financial intermediaries are backed by loans to
entrepreneurs and by government bonds, which are account balances with the
government. Thus, the underlying assets which are the source of liquidity for
deposit claims are private loans and government bonds.
It may be the case that the economy has suﬃcient intertemporal productive
capacity for supplying liquid assets. In this case, eﬃciency can be achieved with-
out a central bank. Otherwise, there is a role for the government in augmenting
the supply of liquid assets. One way to achieve eﬃciency when the private sec-
tor cannot supply suﬃcient liquidity is for the government to ban the issue of
private circulating notes, and then conduct monetary and fiscal policy appro-
priately. Alternatively, the government could supply the appropriate quantity
of government bonds, and permit unrestricted issue of private circulating notes
by financial intermediaries.
Monetary policy can be non-neutral, in that a one-time open market pur-
chase can reduce the real interest rate permanently and increase private lend-
ing. However, this nonneutrality occurs at the margin only if the government
is behaving suboptimally. At the optimum, the costs of currency issue imply a
deviation from the Friedman rule at the optimum.
Our model delivers results that are favorable to a private role for the issue
of circulating currency. The consensus view appears to be that it is appropri-
ate for the government to have a monopoly in the issue of small-denomination
circulating liabilities. Indeed, even Milton Friedman (Friedman 1960) reasoned
that there are market failures unique to the market for currency that make gov-
ernment monopolization welfare-improving. However, there is ample theoreti-
cal and empirical support for the relative eﬃciency of private money systems.
On the theoretical side, Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999), Champ, Smith, and
Williamson (1996), Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999), and Williamson
(1999), have all constructed models showing how private money systems can
work well. On the empirical side, Champ, Smith, and Williamson (1996) show
how the Canadian private money system that existed before 1935 acted to pro-
vide an elastic currency, and Smith and Weber (1999) study the similar behavior
of the Suﬀolk banking system during the free banking era in the United States.
Thus, it is not far-fetched to propose that a private money system could be
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eﬃcient.
Our results concerning recent monetary policy in the United States are both
encouraging and discouraging. On the encouraging side, it is certainly possible
to have large increases in the stock of outside money which do not produce
inflation. This can be due either to a liquidity trap phenomenon or because the
increase in the money stock is backed by private lending. In either case, prices
do not change as a result of the monetary expansion because the additional
outside money is retired in the future, either through taxation or by using the
returns on the central bank’s portfolio. On the discouraging side, when the
nominal interest rate is zero, it is not possible to engineer additional increases
in private lending through “quantitative easing,” unless the central bank lends
on better terms than does the private sector. But in that case, this results in a
redistribution of wealth and can change the allocation of credit.
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